The study of ideology has had a complex relation to the activity of political philosophy. As John Plamenatz long ago pointed out, the philosophes such as Voltaire hoped that a 'science of ideas' could take us beyond (mere) philosophic speculations: as Newtonian science advanced beyond Cartesian speculation, so too might we become scientific in our thinking about society.
might we become scientific in our thinking about society.
i And just as Newton showed the errors of Descartes, so too would a scientific study of social ideas show how traditional political doctrines were confused and mistaken; by correcting these mistakes we could be led to a better society. Right from the beginning, the study of ideology was seen not simply as an alternative -but also as a corrective -to philosophical speculation.
Much of the subsequent development of the ideological approach to political ideas stressed its scientific credentials; under the influence of Karl Mannheim the study of ideology became a general sociology of knowledge. ii Increasingly, it came to stress causal or functional explanations over reasoned internal analysis.
Theorists of ideology such as Marx postulated the causes of political ideas and their consequences, or explained them in terms of the roles they play in social systems.
The conviction that all this constituted an unmasking of political philosophy's claims to be revealing the truth about the proper structure of political life not only persisted but was re-emphasized: philosophy itself became just another form of distorted consciousness with its assigned historical role to play. Hegel's Philosophy of Right became The German Ideology.
Michael Freeden's magisterial work, Ideologies and Political Theories, is a key
contribution to contemporary political theory, leading the study of political ideology back in an interpretive and analytic direction. Freeden developed the systematic study of political ideologies in terms of their conceptual 'morphology'.
His path-breaking three-tiered analysis examined the components of a political concept, a political concept, and a system of concepts. iii Ideologies 'decontest' the meaning of political concepts: at the third level -that of conceptual systemspolitical ideologies are systematic relations of such concepts, with some concepts accorded core status, with others pushed to the periphery. The morphological approach is immensely useful: it leads us away from the supposition that the study of ideological thinking is causal and functional, seeing it as an interpretative and analytic. I have learned an immense amount from Freeden's work, and I welcome the opportunity to express my gratitude and deep appreciation. While Freeden's interpretive turn distinguishes him from the earlier great students of ideology, and although he certainly rejects the extreme debunking claims of Marx or Mannheim, he seems to share a core conviction of the other great theorists of ideology -that the universalistic and rationalistic pretensions of Here Freeden is not merely saying that one can view American philosophical liberalism as a political doctrine to be studied as one does conservatism or socialism; he disputes its claims to universalism and non-bias. Like previous students of ideology, he claims to see through the Rawslian self-image to the real picture. Indeed, on my reading this seems to be the main thrust of his extended treatment of American philosophical liberalism in Ideologies and Political Theory. We are told, for example, that 'the non-specifity claimed by Rawls for his political liberalism is chimerical' and 'the range of compatibility between political liberalism and "comprehensive" moral doctrines…is much narrower than Rawls would have us believe '. vi Although we may initially be perplexed by this combination of distinguishing the philosophical from the ideological while also treating them as both subject to ideological analysis, the appearance of contradiction disappears when we keep firmly in mind the crucial distinction between first-and second-level analyses, between 'ideologizing' and 'the analysis of ideology'. xv At the first-level -that of theory construction -the philosopher and the ideologist are said to engage in different activities with different aims. The philosopher, say, seeks to construct an impartial, objective, system of thought aiming at the truth about political life while the ideologist aims at a practical doctrine that has wide appeal and will energize and mobilize. And certainly we do make some such distinction in specific contexts.
We may, for example, call someone an ideologue rather than a philosopher if it is clear that, despite her construction of an elaborate doctrine, it is the conclusions (say, advocacy of a certain account of distributive justice) rather than the doctrine's arguments and analyses, to which she is truly committed. xvi Certainly it is part of the self-image of the philosopher to get things right, and to reason well. Although at the first-level the self-image of these activities may be quite different, at the second-level, that of the study of theories of ideology (rather than the production of such theories), we can see that both the ideologist and the philosopher are 7 performing an ideological function. It is here than the student of ideology appears to see through the philosopher's activity in a way that she does not see through the ideologist's. For the ideologist seems to be more self-aware of what he is doing: he is constructing a practical doctrine with certain political ends in mind.
The student of ideology can analyze this doctrine, point out its functions, and also evaluate it on various counts (more on evaluation anon). Contrast this to the philosopher:
supposedly she thinks she is engaging in the pursuit of universalistic and timeless truth but she is really constructing another ideological system. The philosopher, say Freeden 'assumes that the mask reflects the face'. xvii Thus the second-level activity of the study of philosophy-as-ideology appears to unmask political reality as well as the pretensions of the philosopher in a way that does not apply to the pretensions of the straightforward ideologist.
Although in certain contexts we certainly do distinguish the activity of political philosophy from that of ideology, I believe that Freeden sometimes tends to overdraw the contrast. The philosopher's self-image, I believe, is often considerably more complex than Freeden suggests. That is, even at the level of theory construction, the line between philosophy and ideology is much more contextual than it may first appear.
The Philosopher and the Sophists
One way that Freeden distinguishes political ideologies from political philosophies is in respect to their normative commitments. article, the philosopher is deeply concerned that her arguments be good ones, while the scribbler wishes to mobilize political action. It is hard not to think here of the difference between Socrates and the Sophists: both are engaging in persuasive discourse, but one has the primary aim of uncovering the truth, the other of moving the audience. The student of ideology, it seems, is at least as interested in the Sophist's rhetoric as in the philosopher's argument.
Justificatory Structures
Is this, though, really a distinction between two types of reflective-practical activity, or between informal and formal modes of essentially the same activity?
There is much to say for the idea that it is more a matter of degree of self- open to dispute, but both the political philosopher and the scribbler are creating justificatory structures that seek to show their followers the righteousness of their cause and the advisability of certain lines of action. That is why a creator of a political ideology is different than a rabble rouser: a rabble rouser may be very effective in generating political action ('Let's teach them a lesson they will not forget!'), but we do not get a conceptual structure that can be interpreted as rational because there is no claim to have advanced any sort of justificatory structure.
Of course the standards of justification vary in different contexts. It is certainly true that the justificatory standards of a pamphleteer will be different than those in a philosophical treatise, but within philosophy itself we also find disagreements about justificatory standards. Rawls advances an accessibility condition of acceptable arguments in political philosophy. xxii As far as possible we should rely on 'plain truths, now widely accepted, or available to citizens generally'. xxiii He explicitly maintains that 'convincing philosophical argument' is not sufficient for political justification. xxiv Rawls aims to apply the ideal of toleration to philosophy itself. He thus is searching for a conception of justification between the pamphleteer and the constructor of a refined philosophical system. This alone should warn us against any simple dichotomy between the philosopher's pursuit of truth-in-itself and the ideologist's articulation of a popular justificatory structure.
Justification, Bounded Rationality, and Biases
It is, then, of the first importance not to fall into the erroneous identification of philosophy with justification in terms of truth, full rationality, or the absence of biases. A fundamental dispute among philosophical theories is whether justification should address agents as boundedly rational, or whether justificatory discourse should be addressed only to those with full rationality and full information. Amos
Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and other cognitive psychologists have uncovered a variety of cognitive shortcuts and biases that humans employ when making judgments. We appeal to stereotypes, our judgments on the same matter markedly differ depending in the way the issue is 'framed' (we are much more likely to approve of a policy if we are informed of the number of lives it saves rather than the deaths that will occur), we are bad at probabilistic reasoning, we ignore abstract evidence in favor of vivid stories, and so on. xxv Philosophers disagree whether these are non-rational biases that should be discounted in justification or whether what counts as good reasoning is determined by the actual ways of thinking that people employ, and which generally do a good job in helping them live their lives. xxvi So within philosophy there is deep dispute about the extent to which folk reasoning counts as good reasoning. But clearly, if that is so, the line between philosophy, which focuses on 'good reasoning' and ideologies, which build on people's actual reasoning, with all its flaws, blurs and perhaps even disappears.
Reason and the Emotions
Nor should we think that, while the philosopher constructs his system simply on the basis of logic and reason, the ideologist appeals to emotion. xxvii Since at least Hume, modern philosophy has been well aware of the importance of emotion for normative thought, and recent investigations of moral thinking have led to a renewed appreciation of the fundamental role of our sentiments in morality xxviii and, we might say, in 'socio-political interaction.' xxix As I argued (quite a long time ago, now) xxx the best account of the very idea of value 'assigns emotional import' to value xxxi -indeed, more than that, it sees value as primarily an emotional response. So philosophy, no less than more popular justificatory structures, canand should -put the emotions at the very heart of the analysis.
The One and the Many
Sometimes Freeden suggests that a core difference between ideology and philosophy is that philosophy is the creation of an individual thinker, while ideology is the construction of groups. xxxii There is certainly something to this: popular justificatory structures tend to reflect widespread popular understandings, while philosophies tend to be individual constructions of creative thinkers. But again, the question is whether this really marks off a difference in kind. One of the disputes within normative philosophy is the extent to which philosophic systems should be simply a refinement of ordinary understandings, or whether, based on claims to superior insight, they can constitute a sharp break with popular justificatory structures. The relation between commonsense moral practice and moral philosophy offers a useful analogy. One view would see their relation as akin to Freeden's distinction between ideology and political philosophy: moral practice is the creation of the everyman (or at least the articulate everyman) whose eye is set firmly on practice and results, while moral theory is the product of a philosopher in her study. Think, though, about Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. On his view the philosophical method of commonsense morality appeals to the 'consensus of mankind -or at least that portion of mankind that combines adequate intellectual enlightenment with a serious concern for morality'. xxxiii The philosopher of commonsense sees moral truth as generally revealed through the actual practices and judgments of (more or less) ordinary individuals as they live their lives, though the philosopher certainly may see herself as qualified to point out contradictions and errors in this morality of everyman. Here we see a complex dynamic between the popular justificatory structure and philosophical articulation of it -one does not collapse into the other, but neither can we say that one is the creation of a collective and the other an individual mind.
Rawls's understanding of political philosophy approximates such a view. The philosopher's construction begins with concepts generally accessible in the political culture, though the ultimate way these are brought together may well lead to new insights into justified political structures. (Compare Bosanquet's claim that the dominant system of social ideas is never quite harmonious and so stands in need of rationalization: 'the general will is a process continuously emerging from the relatively unconscious into reflective consciousness'.) xxxiv To be sure, Freeden rejects Rawls's claim to have rationally articulated common concepts; he approvingly cites Bernard Yack's assertion that Rawls 'merely superimposes his philosophically designed conception upon something he calls our popular culture'. xxxv The point here, though, is that a longstanding self-image of many philosophical projects has been that popular justificatory structures constitute the starting place and supplies the materials from which philosophy builds, while also providing a check on how far philosophy can depart from its popular basis.
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III THE SECOND-LEVEL INTERPRETATIVE ENTERPRISE
Conceptual Analysis and the Pull of the Normative
Thus far I have been questioning the idea that we can distinguish the study of ideology from political philosophy by sharply distinguishing two different firstlevel enterprises -the ideological and the philosophical. The relation between the popular and the refined is itself a matter of internal controversy within philosophy:
there is no Archimedean point from which to depict their true relation that remains outside the fray. Any proposal for a dividing line takes place within the realm of philosophical dispute.
Let us, then, turn to the key question: the relation of the first-level activity of the ideologist/philosopher to the second-level activity of the student of ideology/political theory. Now the earlier generation of theorists of ideology had no doubt that their second-level activity was entirely distinct from the activity they studied. Whatever else one says about Marx's theory of ideology, his materialism provided a clear basis for unmasking the self-image of philosophy and other ideologies. Philosophy insists that it is regulated by truth and reason: Marx replies that, like all other practical activities it is ultimately a servant of the mode of production and its dominant interests.
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The production of ideas, of conceptions of consciousness, is … directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life…. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., -real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse responding to these….
…. So Freeden must be committed to a certain normative analysis. However we can see that this does not mean, after all, that he is simply engaging in first-level normative political philosophy. The study of political ideologies can be a different task than constructing first-level normative theories in political philosophy, and it can lead to taking some normative positions on first-level philosophical disputes.
To understand the distinction between first-level normative justification and the normative study of ideology we need to know how it can be that an interpretive activity is distinct from first-level normative theorizing yet inevitably takes positions on such theorizing, and when so doing engages in that very first-level normative activity that
it is studying. When we understand how this is not only possible, but necessary, we will better see the relation of the study of ideologies to political philosophy.
The Interpretive Activity
To see how we can usefully distinguish first-level justificatory structures from 'second-level' interpretation and analysis of such structures, consider a case with which every reader of this chapter will be familiar: the distinction between Hobbes's and Locke's political theories, and our teaching of these political theories to our students. Seldom is teaching Hobbes and Locke anything like simple advocacy of Hobbesian or Lockean theory. We do not simply repeat their arguments, but we explore their assumptions, investigate the moves they make, the way they define their concepts and so on: we interpret and analyze their justificatory structures. But note that when we do that, we cannot help but evaluate them as well. We do not simply describe Hobbes's model of humans and his claim that they will be in a state of war unless ruled by a sovereign; we chart out the arguments, but we question them too. Our second-level activity of interpreting the canon pulls us into first-level normative analysis: we cannot help but evaluate as we interpret. Teaching can go very wrong in two ways: it may either lapse into simply first-level advocacy in which what should be an interpretation of a text becomes either a battle for it or against it, or it can become no more than an exegesis, in which the claims are clarified, but still essentially merely repeated.
Neither is an adequate interpretative stance.
The second-order interpretation of those justificatory structures we call ideologies and political philosophies is broadly similar. It is neither itself a firstlevel argument nor simply a description of another's first-level argument. As
Freeden's work exemplifies so well, it feels the pull of the normative without entirely giving into it and so becoming yet another first-level justificatory endeavor. Why must good interpretation be like this, being pulled toward the normative, but always able to draw back?
IV INTERPRETATION, ANALYSIS AND THE RATIONAL
Making the Natives Intelligible
To interpret a theory via analysis is to make it intelligible. When we approach a political theory, we are usually confronted by a diagnosis of some political or social problem, some basic claims about the way the world operates and the nature of humans, and a plan or prescription about how to deal with the problem. Now the preferred first step in making all this intelligible -to make sense of it -is to see it as rational. If the problems Hobbes points to are real, if his analyses of their causes are well-grounded, and if his prescriptions would indeed solve the problem, Hobbes's political theory immediately becomes intelligible to us. Because, despite all of our shortcomings in this regard, we are still rational creatures who can grasp other's thoughts best when we see those thoughts as rational and sensible, our first task as interpreters is to render our objects of study as rational as we can. We are generally intelligible to each other because we are rational, and can understand the What justifies this procedure is the facts of disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of massive agreements. Applied to language, this principle reads: the more sentences we conspire to accept (whether or not through a medium of interpretation), the better we understand the rest, whether or not we agree with them. xli
The student of ideology and political theory is like an anthropologist confronting a native culture that she does not share, but is trying to make sense of. How is she to interpret Hobbes's statements that 'nothing can be unjust' in the state of nature and that under some conditions one has an obligation to keep covenants in the state of nature? xlii Like an anthropologist who seems to confront natives who are uttering contradictory sentences, the student of political theory sees her 'native' as appearing to contradict himself. But this makes it all puzzling and unintelligible to us. To make sense of Hobbes is, at least in the first instance, to show that what he says is consistent and, if possible, well-grounded.
Levels of Intelligibility
There are, of course, different ways in which we can make another intelligible.
Although Davidson maintained that the principle of charity supposes that our aim is to render true the statements that are the object of our interpretation, often we can render them intelligible and yet stop far short of rendering them true. The pillow at the top end of the bed must not touch the wooden back of the bedstead.... The eiderdown...had to be shaken before being laid on the bed so that its bottom became very thick; afterwards, however, she never failed to even out this accumulation of feathers by pressing them apart. xliii
At this point the behavior is simply incomprehensible. Freud appeals to reasoning -albeit still odd reasoning -to make some sense of it. In the course of her therapy:
[s]he found out the central meaning of her ceremonial one day when she suddenly understood the meaning of the rule that the pillow must not touch the back of the bedstead. The pillow, she said, had always been a woman to her and the upright wooden back a man. Thus she wanted -by magic, we must interpolate -to keep man and woman apart -that is, to separate her parents from each other, and not allow them to have sexual intercourse....
If a pillow was a women, then the shaking of the eiderdown till all the feathers were at the bottom and caused a swelling there had a sense as well. It meant making the woman pregnant; but she never failed to smooth away the pregnancy again, for she had been for years afraid that her parents' intercourse would result in another child.... xliv
As Freud notes, these are 'wild thoughts'. Admittedly, if 'wooden bedstead = father', and 'pillow = mother', then we can see a sort of reasoning in keeping bedstead and pillow apart. If she was correct in thinking that what she does to the bedstead and pillow affects what her parents do at night, then keeping the bedstead and pillow apart has a certain sort of rationality to it. But, still, we have made progress: what was simply incomprehensible now is becoming intelligible as it is becoming a bit more rational -but we still need to know why she believes these things.
In interpreting political doctrines, though, we aim at deeper intelligibility: we seek not only to make doctrines less crazy, but reasonable pretty far down. Here,
Freeden is surely correct that we will treat refined and popular justificatory structures differently. We expect a refined political doctrine to be intelligible pretty 'far down', though even there may be limits, as when we see that a conclusion ultimately rests on a doctrine that is wildly implausible -think of Bosanquet's claim that reality is ultimately composed, in some sense, of ideas. However, we are apt to come to the conclusion of implausibility quicker when interpreting more popular doctrines, which may well rest on widespread convictions that we find not only hard to credit, but sometimes 'wild'. The study of fascism, especially Nazism, is a case in point: beliefs about the identity of the 'Aryan race' and its relation to modern Germans was mythical, and about as sensible as Freud's patient's belief in the efficacy of keeping the bedstead from touching the pillow.
By the Interpreter's Lights
As Davidson says, though, to make a view sensible is to make it true (or reasonable) by our own lights. The student of political ideologies, no more than the anthropologist, can stand outside of her own normative commitments about what is sensible and rational in her efforts at interpretation. Here is the pull of the normative in one's interpretation: to make Hobbes's conceptual scheme sensible is to make it sensible by one's own lights, and so the process of interpretation is inherently normative. Every interpretative move is normative: we are trying to see how a conceptual structure is rational and sensible. If we see it as normatively sound, then we immediately see it as an intelligible creation: we understand the conceptual structure that confronts us, and we begin to know our way around in it.
The more we can plausibly see a conceptual structure as rational and well-thought out, the more intelligible it is to us.
Thus the complexity of second-level analysis of systems of thought. Our aim is to understand classical liberalism, the new liberalism, American philosophical liberalism, or socialism, not to engage in first-level normative disputes with them.
We do not wish to enter the fray. But to understand a justificatory structure requires applying our normative criteria of what constitutes good reasoning, plausible premises, and reasonable views about the world. We endeavor to make it intelligible against a background of standards of intelligibility that appeal to our 
VI. INTERPRETATION, UNMASKING, AND THE APPEAL TO ERROR
Walking a Tightrope
The student of political thought, then, has to walk a tightrope. She cannot but help draw on her own normative commitments throughout her analysis. However, because her aim is to make a first-level justificatory structure intelligible, as an interpreter her first response cannot be to unmask the pretensions of first-level justificatory discourse. There is always the temptation to "see through" first-level discourse as deeply flawed and implausible. To quickly draw on one's normative commitments and views to see through the pretensions of first-level political doctrines may make for good first-level disputation, but it is to fail in the interpretive task. For unmasking often tends to make our subject unintelligible to us. How could the creators have been so unaware of their faults? Did they really fail to see that they sought the impossible? How could they have made such ridiculous claims to objectivity when all along it is so clear they were grinding their own axes? So far from making our subject intelligible we now need an additional explanation: one that makes sense of the failure to construct a rationally intelligible view of the world. Unveiling the reality behind a justificatory structure can render our subject less intelligible in much the same way that translating a native language as chock-full of falsehoods renders their form of life unintelligible to us.
We can press the anthropological analogy further. One of the dangers of fieldwork -to which early anthropology succumbed -is to assume an easy superiority over one's subjects, so that of course the anthropologist sees things so much clearer than does the native. If the anthropologist takes this attitude, then her default supposition will be that her subjects are wrong because they fail to see nearly as far as she does. And so her field journal will be a study in obvious errors.
This is exactly the attitude that encourages lack of understanding of one's subjects;
to assume that one sees much further than do they undermines the supposition that one's aim is to see how their views are true or reasonable. Much the same holds true for the study of political theories and doctrines. Interpretation requires a hefty dose of allegiance to the principle of charity, and so using one's basic normative commitments to help make sense of what others think, rather than to reveal their errors and follies. The deep flaw of the unmasking approach to political ideologies is its tooeasy assumption of a superior perspective, from which sees so much further, and so much deeper, than first-level political doctrines. Confidence that one sees much deeper is always a barrier to good interpretation, for it tempts us to assume that others are blinkered and wrong.
The Intelligibility of Error
As always, there is a complication: sometimes the best way to make others intelligible is to see them as making a common error. xlvi Think back to the use of heuristics (section II), and suppose we hold that relying on them is not rational.
Once we have good evidence that people tend to make these mistakes, we can appeal to them in our interpretations of why people believe and act as they do, but when we do so we make their beliefs and actions explicable by showing they are not rational.
Consider an example from some of my other work. Based on empirical evidence as well as theoretical work concerning complex social systems, I have argued that it is extremely difficult to make accurate and precise social predictions, and that this undermines a great deal of what goes on under the name of public policy. xlvii Yet, I have argued, audiences are extraordinarily resistant to this analysis: in the face of a great deal of evidence, they continue to believe that they can accurately predict the future of social systems. In explaining this I appeal again to the work of Kahneman and Tversky, which indicates that people consistently ascribe high levels of probability to very faulty predictions. Indeed, they report that 'subjects are most confident in predictions that are most likely to be off the mark'.
' [P] eople are prone to experience much confidence in highly fallible judgments, a phenomenon that might be called the illusion of validity'. xlviii So we can understand people's insistence that they can make accurate predictions not by seeing how they are rational to think this, but by showing that it is the result of a common human bias.
We can extend the idea to the study of political doctrines. Explicability may be better furthered by supposing a doctrine rests on an error than by supposing that its claims are true, or justifiable, or at least reasonable. This leads us right back to our starting point: the Marxian causal/functionalist view of ideology. We can think of Marx as proposing that all of philosophy is explained by one grand 'cognitive bias' -philosophers produce doctrines that serve the interests of the ruling class.
That is what renders their content intelligible. But notice how this tack moves us away from intelligibility through analysis back to the original causal/functional perspective of the study of ideology. The more we make a doctrine explicable by citing common human error the less we see it as an object to be made intelligible through analyzing its structure and the reasoning behind it. It is also a risky move;
it supposes the superior perspective and insight of the unmasking approach, and so always runs the risk of failing to appreciate the reasonableness of its subject by a too-easy assumption that it is riddled with errors of which one is free. Although we cannot say that intelligibility can never be furthered through pointing to common error, it is a temptation to a biased claim to superiority unless very solidly grounded in compelling evidence.
VII CONCLUSION: A VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE
The subtlety and difficulty of the interpretive enterprise is all too clear. Our aim is to understand the subjects of our study as at least reasonable articulations of the political world, and to do that we must exercise considerable charity in interpreting their content. Even if we do not interpret their claims as true we at least aim to make them rational or reasonable. But our project of making a political doctrine intelligible may fail: we may be confronted by some seemingly 'wild' thoughts at the basis of the doctrine, and to that extent we may be puzzled why people would believe it. But, then again, sometimes we can employ psychological or economic theory to show why the 'wild' error is explicable, and then we can further advance the interpretive project, even past the bounds of rational intelligibility. However, to appeal to common error when interpreting a doctrine is to run the risk of forsaking interpretation for unmasking, for again we are claiming to see through our subjects and their false consciousness. And yet the background of all our interpretive efforts is our own normative commitments, and these will enter into our interpretive analysis.
Freeden is correct in suggesting that 'wild' thoughts, and making them explicable by pointing to common error, are more common when analyzing popular justificatory structures. I remain unconvinced, however, that there is a distinction in kind between the tasks of interpreting refined and popular justificatory structures. Writing from the philosophy side of the philosophy/ideology divide, I see as much the same the work of the interpreter of philosophical doctrines and that of the interpreter of the popular justificatory structures that are called 'ideologies'. In both, a fine touch is needed to know when we have exhausted intelligibility through rationality and must resort to explicability through common error. In neither is the unmasking approach helpful as a mode of interpretation, though it is a tried-and-true method of first-level normative disputation.
I began by pointing out (section I) that Freeden engages in extensive criticisms of Rawls's and Dworkin's normative claims and I asked: is such criticism consistent with the interpretive enterprise, or does it show merely first-level engagement? It should now be clear that normative criticism is part and parcel of interpretation; to interpret is to draw on one's own standards, but this will inevitably lead to disagreement as well as rationalization. There is no incoherence at the root of the critical interpretation: indeed, criticism and interpretation go hand in hand.
Of course, we are still confronted with the more difficult question of whether an interpretation resorts too quickly to criticism, and so lapses into unmasking or simple first-level dispute. From my view of the divide over 'American philosophical liberalism' -a version of liberalism that, in its basics, I believe is sound -I tend to think that Freeden's treatment comes close to being a first-level disputation rather than a second-level interpretive enterprise. I certainly can understand how this happens. There is, let us say, considerable resistance to Rawls's general approach: those trained in political science from both sides of the Atlantic see it as overly abstract and unworldly; xlix on the European side of the Atlantic philosophers are perhaps apt to agree with the political theorists (on the western side, they are certainly split). However, while it is understandable to be tempted into a first-level argument with Rawls, and while that is the bread and 
